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Abstract
There has been an average of approximately 3.9 death penalty exonerations annually in the
United States since 1973 (DPIC, 2021). Wrongful convictions and executions constitute grave
and irreversible errors. Studies show official misconduct is one of the leading causes for
wrongful convictions and exonerations. Misconduct by police, prosecutors, and judges includes a
wide range of behaviors such as coercing confessions, depriving rights to legal counsel,
threatening witnesses, and concealing evidence. Operating under the due process model, the
adversarial legal system is designed to detect and prevent any procedural violations of
defendant’s rights, including official misconduct. Utilizing Packer’s (1964) due process and
crime control models, and major criminal justice theories such as subculture and rational choice
as interpretive frameworks, the current study examines the nature of official misconduct and its
impact on exoneration. Drawing on 167 exonerated death penalty cases from the Death Penalty
Information Center’s website and employing the content analysis methodology, the current study
generated several key findings. First, official misconduct was prevalent among these exonerated
death penalty cases, with 60%, 65%, and 17% of the cases involving police, prosecutorial, and
judicial misconduct respectively. Second, major typologies of official misconduct were
identified, such as coercing defendants and witness, evidence tampering, and violating
procedural rules. Third, police misconduct was significantly correlated with longer exoneration
processes and exonerations through forces external to the criminal justice system. Major
theoretical and policy implications for the effectiveness of the due process model in error
corrections are discussed.
Keywords: official misconduct, death penalty, wrongful conviction, exoneration, error
correction
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The actions of criminal justice officials, namely police, prosecutors, and judges, have
been widely connected to wrongful convictions in criminal cases (Bedau & Radelet, 1987;
Gross, 1998; Gross & O’Brien, 2008; Huff, 2003). While certain types of misconduct are
formally illegal, other actions may technically be legal but still violate professional ethics and
public trust (Stern, 1987). Official misconduct occurs at various levels of the justice system and
in different case types, including cases that involve the death penalty. Such misconduct includes
a variety of behaviors, such as concealing or altering evidence, witness tampering, coercing
confessions, torture, bribery, and perjury (Alschuler, 1972; Bishopp et al., 2016; Buckley, 1969;
Butler, 2014; Covey, 2013; Gross et al., 2020; Hamilton & Foote, 2018; Kane, 2002; Kirchmeier
et al., 2009; Minsker, 2009; Yaroshefsky, 2004), and may contribute to wrongful convictions.
Wrongful convictions undermine the criminal justice system because for every innocent
person wrongfully punished, the actual offender remains free and could pose a threat to public
safety. A wrongful conviction in a death penalty case may result in even graver harm as it would
be an irreversible error if an execution is carried out. These concerns highlight the importance of
examining the factors that contribute to both wrongful convictions as well as exonerations,
particularly involving official misconduct.
Theory and Background
Packer’s (1964) crime control and due process models provide a theoretical framework
for examining both official misconduct and error correction mechanisms in exonerated death
penalty cases. Under the crime control model, the primary purpose of the criminal justice system
is controlling crime. Misconduct engaged in by the police, prosecutors, and judges may be
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tolerated to a certain degree for pursuing system efficiency and finality. Conversely, under the
due process model, the primary goal of the justice system is protecting the defendant’s rights.
Controlling crime is of secondary importance to ensuring that individuals receive a fair and
impartial trial.
As an adversarial common law system (Cohen, 1989; LexisNexis, 1997) the due process
model ensures defendants procedural rights and protections, especially in capital cases. For
example, the U.S. Constitution asserts that individuals have equal protection under the law (U.S.
Const. amend XIV), the right to a fair trial (U.S. Const amend VI), security against unreasonable
searches, seizures, and interrogation techniques (U.S. Const. amend IV), and cruel and unusual
punishment (U.S. Const. Amend. VIII). Additionally, defendants have rights to various appeals
and habeas corpus procedures (e.g., argue to state or federal court that constitutional rights
violations, such as official misconduct, occurred in the case) (American Bar Association, 2019).
The appellate court has the authority to modify or reverse the original ruling, or to remand a new
trial, upon identifying a substantive error or constitutional violation.
Despite the procedural safeguards in the Constitution and error correction mechanisms in
place to prevent, detect, and address official misconduct, research has found that official
misconduct is one of the leading causes for wrongful conviction in capital cases (DPIC, 2020;
Gross & O’Brien, 2008; Krieger, 2011; Leo, 2005; O’Brien et al., 2019; Rafail & Mahoney,
2019). Other common errors involve witness misidentification and perjury, inadequate defense
counsel and forensic errors (Gross & O’Brien, 2008; Huff 2002; Huff 2003; Kassin et al., 2012;
Krieger, 2011; Leo, 2005; O’Brien et al., 2019; Olney & Bonn, 2015; Ramsey & Frank, 2007).
Relevant theories such as rational choice, discretion, subculture, and the criminal justice system
as an assembly line have been widely discussed to account for various acts of official misconduct
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(Alschuler, 1975; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Goldsmith, 1990; Gross, 1996; Herbert, 1998; Klein,
2006; Klockars et al., 2000; Minsker, 2009; Reiss, 1984).
Death sentences have generally decreased, yet the number of exonerations has increased
since 1976 (DPIC, n.d.; Ellsworth & Gross, 2012). Many of the factors leading to exonerations
seemed to be through mechanisms ‘external’ to the justice system (e.g., through DNA testing,
involvement of a third party such as NGOs, or emergence of the real offender) (Gould and Leo,
2015). This suggests that the criminal justice system might not be effective in timely preventing,
detecting, and self-correcting errors, which may contribute to both wrongful convictions and
difficulties in exonerations.
Purpose and Significance of the Current Study
As the death penalty is the most serious punishment a defendant can receive, it is crucial
to form a more complete understanding of the criminal process in capital cases. With the number
of exonerated death row prisoners growing each year in the United States, further investigations
regarding the factors involved in such exonerations is warranted. Past research has documented
that official misconduct does indeed contribute to wrongful convictions, yet few studies have
actually detailed the specific types of misconduct that happen and the extent to which such
behavior occurs. There is also limited research on how official misconduct is detected and
handled in capital cases specifically. Employing Packer’s (1964) due process and crime control
models, and other related criminal justice theories (e.g., rational choice theory, subculture
theory) as the interpretive framework, the current study seeks to explore the relationship between
official misconduct and the mechanisms that contribute to exoneration.
Using a sample of 167 exonerated death penalty cases spanning 1973 to 2019 (Death
Penalty Information Center, n.d.), the current study investigates the types and extent of official
3

misconduct involved in exonerated death penalty cases. Since capital cases often receive more
resources and attention than other criminal cases (Gross & O’Brien, 2008), there is greater
information available about each case, making exonerated death penalty cases a valuable sample
for examination. Manifest and latent content analyses are utilized along with an open-ended
codebook to gather data on official misconduct, error correction mechanisms, and characteristics
of the offender and offense. Using such data, the current study seeks to determine the types and
extent of official misconduct involved in exonerated death penalty cases. The study also explores
the association between official misconduct and the length and types of exoneration. More
specifically, the current study examines if an exoneration takes a longer time, and if it is more
likely to occur through internal criminal justice system’s mechanisms (e.g., by the due process
protections already in place) or by mechanisms external to the system (e.g., involving elements
outside to the criminal justice system) when official misconduct is involved
There are multiple benefits for further investigating the role of official misconduct in
contributing to wrongful convictions as well as the mechanisms that work to correct errors and
act as a catalyst for exoneration. Little research has examined police, prosecutorial, and judicial
misconduct simultaneously and in death penalty cases specifically. This study will thus help
address this gap in the criminological literature, increase awareness of official misconduct, and
potentially yield solutions to the problem through policy recommendations. Moreover,
examining how the system detects and corrects errors in case processing may work to improve
protection of individual rights, help prevent official abuse of power, and ultimately work to
reduce the number of miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions.
As such, the following chapters will provide a more in-depth discussion of official
misconduct and error correction in death penalty cases. Next, chapter two includes an overview
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of Packer’s due process and crime control models as well as literature on official misconduct,
error correction mechanisms, and exonerations. Chapter three focuses on the specific research
questions and methodologies utilized in this study, while chapter four presents statistical
analyses and supplemental case narratives. Finally, chapter five consists of a summary of the
main findings, the limitations of the current study, and implications for future research and
public policy.

5

Chapter 2: Due Process, Official Misconduct, and Exoneration
Following the common law tradition (Cohen, 1989; LexisNexis, 1997), the American
criminal justice system is designed to prevent government abuse of power and to ensure
individuals’ due process rights. This implies that there are mechanisms in place to prevent,
detect, and correct errors like official misconduct throughout the criminal process in order to
adequately protect the rights of defendants. This chapter first provides an overview of Packer’s
(194) due process and crime control models, which serves as a broad interpretive framework for
understanding the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States. The chapter then
reviews the literature regarding police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct in terms of primary
characteristics as well as theoretical explanations. Lastly, this chapter provides background on
the death penalty system in the U.S., so as to situate discussions of exonerations and error
correction mechanisms within the death penalty process.
Packer’s Due Process and Crime Control Models
Packer (1964) proposed the due process and crime control models as a means of
assessing the criminal process and forming a better understanding of the criminal justice system.
The criminal justice system operates under the idea that the criminal process is invoked once
there is presumption that a criminal law has been violated. Those who actually carry out the
criminal process, namely police, prosecutors, and judiciaries, have great amounts of power and
discretion in their abilities. However, there must be a balance where the criminal process is
carried out appropriately and effectively while also ensuring that the due process rights of
individuals are protected. This implies that governmental power must be constrained to
safeguard individual rights, while also ensuring system efficiency. As such, the crime control and
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due process models constitute two extremes of the same continuum, with the actual criminal
process falling somewhere in between the two ends.
The crime control model centers primarily around crime control and prevention. The
dominant idea is that if crime is not adequately controlled, then social controls will break down,
crime will flourish, society will be in disarray, and individual freedom will be lost. Suppressing
the rights of individuals to an extent is seen as acceptable in order to impede crime and preserve
social order. According to Packer (1964), under the crime control model, the criminal process
must work swiftly and uniformly with few procedural limitations. Police, prosecutors, and judges
should be trusted to carry out their duties properly with little intervention. Police officers are
primarily entrusted to determine a suspect’s guilt or innocence through largely unchecked,
administrative, pretrial investigative power. The later phases in the criminal process rely heavily
on these pretrial decisions. Making such early initial determinations allows the crime control
model to process a large number of cases efficiently while also repressing crime. Given this
administrative fact-finding, Packer (1964) argues that the crime control model will ultimately
result in the accused pleading guilty or eventually being exonerated. This outcome-oriented
model emphasizes effectiveness, efficiency, and finality, while aiming to protect the general
public from crime.
The due process model also values suppressing crime and fact-finding, but places more of
an emphasis on preventing and correcting errors so as to protect the accused’s rights. Errors
could arise at all stages in the process and include acts such as witnesses providing inaccurate
information, authorities coercing confessions from suspects, altering or suppressing evidence, or
applying the law with errors. In order to minimize the impact of such occurrences on a
defendant’s case outcome, formal adjudicative fact-finding processes are used to more reliably
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determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Compared to the crime control model, less of an
emphasis is placed on efficiency (e.g., high clearance or conviction rate). Instead, fair and just
processes and protection of individual rights are of more central importance. Packer (1964) notes
that the sanctions and stigma brought on by the criminal process are “the heaviest deprivation
that the government can inflict on an individual” (p. 16), which highlights the importance of
procedural controls and safeguards. The fundamental assumption underlying the due process
model is that a fair and just process is more likely to lead to a fair and just outcome. A balance
must be struck where a defendant’s constitutional rights are protected throughout the criminal
process but the proper sanctions for a crime are also given. This process-oriented model thus
places a greater emphasis on due process and multiple layers of procedural safeguards to ensure
a fair and just outcome. Presumption of innocence and defendants’ rights are at the core of this
model of justice.
To achieve these ends of the due process model, the U.S. Constitution established
numerous procedural safeguards. For example, the Fourth Amendment stipulates the criminally
accused’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures by the police, while the Fifth
Amendment affords one the right not to self-incriminate, right to a jury trial, and right against
double-jeopardy. The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant the right to a speedy and public trial
with a jury, legal counsel, and knowledge of the charges being brought. The Fourteenth
Amendment also provides all citizens equal protections under the law.
Over the last few decades, the U.S. Supreme court has expanded and specified some of
these safeguards to provide more meaningful and practical protections of the rights of the
accused. For instance, regarding police interrogation, in Lynumn v. Illinois (1963), the Court
ruled that police shall not obtain a confession through coercion (e.g., in this case, the police
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claimed they would take away the defendant’s child if she did not cooperate with them).
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) established that detained criminal suspects must be informed by the
police of their right to legal counsel and right not to self-incriminate. Confession evidence
obtained without a Miranda warning was deemed illegal as well and could be excluded from
evidence (see also Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). Other cases such as Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) and
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) also established rules on involuntary confessions. On the right to
legal representation, Brewer v. Williams (1977) stipulated that police officers cannot question
suspects without their counsel present, unless the accused waives their right to counsel. Gideon
v. Wainwright (1963) extended the right to legal counsel to indigent defendants who, when
facing a felony charge, must have counsel provided by the government.
Rules have also been established against inducement by authorities, with Sorrell v.
United States (1932) allowing for an ‘entrapment defense’ in a case if the defendant was
intentionally lured into committing a criminal act by authorities. Relating to official’s use of
evidence, in Brady v. Maryland (1963), the High Court ruled that withholding evidence in a
criminal case (e.g., such as police or prosecutors hiding/destroying evidence) violated a
defendant’s 14th Amendment right to due process. In a similar vein, in Mooney v. Holohan
(1935), the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors knowingly presenting perjured testimony also
infringed on due process rights, while Napue v. Illinois (1959) held that cases with false or
misleading testimony warrant a retrial. Rules regarding juror tampering have also been
established, with Remmer v. United States (1954) holding that if allegations of juror tampering
by authorities arise in a case, the accused party must disprove the allegations or demonstrate that
such behavior would not have impacted the jury’s decision.
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Besides these specified and expanded procedural rights aimed at curbing official abuse of
power and protecting the rights of the criminally accused, the criminal process has built-in
safeguards to allow error-corrections. These safeguards include direct appeals, habeas corpus
procedures, and executive clemency. Additionally, there is a diffusion of power where state
authority of police and prosecutors is checked by members of the court, defense, and jurors.
It is important to note that the orientation of a society in respect to these models may ebb
and flow over time. With the decentralized nature of the American criminal justice system,
Packer (1964) notes that one jurisdiction may take more of a crime control approach, while
another jurisdiction may embrace more of a due process approach. Despite the due process
model being largely the hallmark of the criminal justice system in the United States, different
aspects of both the due process and crime control models can be seen across the country. For
example, during the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court made
various interpretations of constitutional rights to further protect defendants. These
interpretations, like Miranda Rights, tended to align more so with the due process model
(Sanchez, 2020). In contrast, during a shift to greater punitiveness in the 1980s and 1990s,
policies such as California’s Three Strike Sentencing Laws were more oriented with the crime
control model (Hayes & Lynn, 2020; Jones & Newburn, 2002; Sanchez, 2020). Additionally,
relatively speaking, the due process model typically dominates the law enforcement style in
smaller, rural areas where citizens tend to have closer relationships with officials, whereas in
larger, urban areas the crime control model tends to prevail (Weisheit et al., 1995).
Overall, the larger socio-cultural shifts (e.g., civil rights movement, punitiveness) and
varying demographic challenges may interact with agency goals, cultures, and thus further
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impact the behavior of officials. The following section reviews the specific institutional goals,
subcultures, and official misconduct by the police, prosecutors, and judiciary.
Official Misconduct: Types, Extent, and Explanations
Official misconduct, in this study, refers to unethical or illegal behavior by police,
prosecutors, and judges in capital cases. Official misconduct encompasses a wide array of
behaviors and has been documented in both non-death penalty and death penalty cases. In the
following sections, an overview of police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct will be
provided in addition to a variety of possible explanations for such actions.
Police Misconduct
Police misconduct can be defined as any inappropriate behavior on the part of any law
enforcement officer that is either illegal or immoral (Champion, 2001). For example, destroying
evidence relating to a case is illegal (e.g., violates 14th amendment due process rights), while
being misleading about the facts of a case during interrogation could be considered unethical but
might not be deemed illegal. Examples of misconduct include verbal abuse (e.g., inappropriate
comments/remarks) (Bishopp et al., 2016), intentionally trying to influence the outcome of a case
(Skogan & Meares, 2004), framing, torturing, or coercing confessions from those in custody
(Bishopp et al., 2016; Butler, 2014; Findley, 2008; Hamilton & Foote, 2018; Ritchie & Mogul,
2008; Son & Rome, 2004), engaging in bribery (Donner et al., 2016; Kane, 2002), and
committing perjury during testimony (Covey, 2013). A multitude of explanations have been
proposed to explain such police misconduct, including the rational choice perspective and
discretion, police subcultures and corruption, the police as a public institution and the crimefighter image, and police competence.
11

Types and Extent of Police Misconduct.
According to a recent report from the National Registry of Exonerations on official
misconduct, of 2,400 exonerated criminal cases, 35% involved some kind of police misconduct
(Gross et al., 2020). Among these incidences of misconduct, 80% were related to witness
tampering. Such actions often involved threatening witnesses, procurement of false testimony,
and inducement of suspect identification. More specifically, an officer tainting a witness
identification (e.g., telling a witness which suspect to pinpoint) occurred in about 6% of
exonerated cases.
Police concealing or tampering with evidence or information was also prevalent,
constituting 33% of the 2,400 cases analyzed (Gross et al., 2020). Evidence fabrication occurred
in about 10% of exonerated cases, with officers falsifying forensic reports, manipulating
evidence, and potentially destroying evidence. In about 4% of cases, police planted evidence
pertaining to the case and then claimed to have discovered it naturally. Police perjury also played
a role in 13% of the cases. Additional studies have noted police perjury as a contributing factor
for false convictions as well (Covey, 2013; DPIC, 2019; Gross & O’Brien, 2008). These actions
occurred most often in cases involving murder, which is the crime comprising the majority of
death penalty cases (DPIC, 2020). Harmon (2001) further argues that misconduct (e.g.,
tampering with evidence, improper investigative strategies) often occurs in capital cases that are
eventually overturned or exonerated.
Concerns regarding false confessions have grown in recent years, especially with forensic
testing leading to exonerations in instances where the suspect confessed (Findley, 2008). Gross
et al., (2020) found that a false confession contributed to a wrongful conviction in 12% of 2,400
cases, with a majority of such confessions resulting from misconduct. In about 2% of these cases,
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police falsified entire confessions, pushed defendants who were either illiterate or spoke a
different language to sign a document which was later revealed to be a confession, or claimed an
oral but unrecorded confession was made, meaning evidence of the confession could not be used
in court (Gross et al., 2020). Covey (2013) also deemed false confessions to be a major factor
related to wrongful convictions. Confessions may be coerced by physical (e.g., inflicting pain,
beatings, suffocation, injury) and/or psychological torture (e.g., mental stress, threats,
humiliation, sleep deprivation) (Definition of Torture, 2004). Psychological torture techniques
are often used by police due to little visible evidence of mistreatment (e.g., cuts, bruises,
wounds) while still creating a sense of hopelessness, fear, and anxiety (Butler, 2014). False
confessions tend to be more prevalent in homicide cases and among juveniles and individuals
with mental illness (Innocence Project, 2013; Kassin, 2014; Leo, 2009; National Registry of
Exonerations, 2015). While there is no exact known rate for false confessions, the Innocence
Project (2011) estimates that false confessions may have contributed to 25% of cases exonerated
by DNA. This estimate does not even account for cases exonerated by other means or cases that
have not yet been exonerated. While coercive interrogation techniques may work to obtain a
truthful confession in some instances, such methods present the risk of having an innocent
suspect falsely confess and result in a wrongful conviction.
Additionally, acts of misconduct have the potential to disproportionately impact minority
groups (Tieger, 1971). Gross et al., (2020) explains that Black defendants were more likely to
encounter official misconduct during case processing than Whites (57% versus 52%
respectively). When considering death penalty cases specifically, these racial differences were
further exacerbated (87% versus 68%). Given the racial composition of the death row, where
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there is a fairly even distribution between White (42.1%) and Black (41.6%) inmates, these
trends are striking (DPIC, 2020).
Explanations for Police Misconduct.
Several plausible explanations have been explored to address police misconduct.
Below is a review of four main explanations: rational choice and discretion, the police
subculture, police as a public institution coupled with the crime fighter image, and police
competence and training.
Rational choice perspective follows the utilitarian and deterrence model (Beccaria, 1764;
Cornish & Clarke, 1986). This framework assumes that rational individuals make decisions
based on a cost-benefit analysis. For example, if the detection rate is low, punishment is light,
and the reward is high, police officers are more likely to engage in misconduct. This cost-benefit
calculation is often complex, involving various officer motivations, individual situational
contexts, and institutional objectives. Such considerations likely impact how police officers
utilize discretion. Police exercise discretion in all sectors of their responsibilities including
service, order maintenance, and law enforcement (Reiss, 1984, Skogan & Meares, 2004). Most
pertinent to the current study is police discretionary power in making arrests and gathering
evidence. In the reality, how police react to any given situation (e.g., arrest, investigate, do
nothing) is often based on alternative courses of action and may often involve an informal or
unorthodox response (Reiss, 1984). The course of action may be determined by a variety of
factors: organizational goals (e.g., high clearance rate for violent crimes), managerial priorities
(e.g., resources, training, and promotion focusing on detecting and combating violent crimes),
the specific situational context, and individual officers’ values and life experiences (e.g., holding
beliefs such as the ends justify the means, and differential treatment based on race or criminal
14

history is acceptable). If unethical or illegal conduct promotes institutional goals, fits managerial
style and the situation, and aligns with an officer’s beliefs, an officer may be more likely to
exercise discretion to engage in misconduct as the reward is likely to be high while the
punishment is minimal.
These perspectives may be further intensified by the police subculture. Due to the
unpredictable and potentially dangerous nature of policing, officers tend to form strong bonds
with their colleagues (Goldsmith, 1990; Herbert, 1998). This environment reinforces beliefs that
officers will provide support against threats and even “maintain secrecy during internal
investigations”, where “loyalty and solidarity” are exchanged for “considerable individual
autonomy” when carrying out their duties (Goldsmith, 1990, pp. 93-94). As police bond with one
another and cultivate the ‘us’ subculture, they may develop distrust or even suspicious attitudes
towards the public (the public then becomes a separate ‘them’ group). When these ideas are
coupled with frequent interactions with the public that could be uncertain or unsafe, officers may
further fall into the ‘us versus them’ mentality, which may provide justification for prejudicial
and unfair treatment of individuals (Herbert, 1998, Tieger, 1971). Secrecy, also often referred to
as the code of silence (Klockars et al., 2000), could be considered a by-product of police
subculture (Goldsmith, 1990). Secrecy also tends to breed corruption, particularly given that the
police profession involves high discretion and low visibility decision making (Skogan and
Meares, 2004).
As a public institution, the police are politically responsible for public safety. Policing
has experienced a “strategic shift” (Reiss, 1984, p. 83) away from providing service and
maintaining order to enforcing the law in recent decades. As a result, police academy training
today emphasizes a knowledge of criminal law, apprehensions, and investigations more so than
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daily order-maintenance and routine interactions with the public. Solving crime thus became a
political mandate dictating resource allocation, training and promotion priorities. When holding
the view of police as ‘crime fighters’, police may view due process regulations as a hindrance to
effective law enforcement. According to Goldsmith (1990), officers tend to reinforce the belief
that using illegal methods to solve a crime is acceptable behavior. In some instances, officers
even believe doing so is “necessary to maintain order” and that “due process must occasionally
be sacrificed if those who break the law are to be apprehended” (p. 94). With this crime-fighter
image, police are under tremendous pressure to solve crimes, particularly violent crimes such as
murder. Nationwide, the clearance rate for homicides is just upwards of sixty percent (Davis et
al., 2014; Davis et al., 2015; Keel et al., 2009; McClellan, 2008). While pressure to solve
homicides may increase clearance rates, it can also lead to misconduct or errors. Officers “may
be tempted to cut corners, to jump to conclusions, and … manufacture evidence to clinch the
case” (Gross, 1996, p. 478). The risk of these actions increases even more when a crime is
particularly heinous or garners large amounts of attention in the news media as multiple parties
(e.g., victim’s loved ones, policy agency administrators, the public generally) may demand
something be done about the crime.
It is also important to note that police misconduct does not constitute only intentional
acts. Questionable actions by officers could also be the result of incompetence or ignorance
instead of intentional malice. For example, a substantial proportion of police shootings are the
product of a lack of training or experience which culminate in an officer making a split-second
decision (Fyfe, 1989). If the situation was better planned for, if training was improved, or if the
officer thought more clearly through their course of action, the shooting likely could have been
prevented in the first place. To better ensure these actions are mitigated in the future, police
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training should thus focus more on enhancing officers’ skills and discretionary decision-making
abilities. In addition, accountability is crucial as without consequences, police misconduct is
unlikely to be deterred. Only approximately 20% of officers who engaged in misconduct from a
sample of 2,400 exonerated cases (about 35% of which involved police misconduct) faced some
disciplinary actions (e.g., consequences from the police agency, convicted of a criminal offense)
(Gross et al., 2020). This number likely does not even account for the majority of police
misconduct unknown to the agency or the public.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Besides being generally defined as unethical or illegal behaviors, prosecutorial
misconduct was specifically considered within the context of inducing a decision “not based on a
rational assessment of evidence” (Alschuler, 1972, p. 643) and actions which “undermined the
fairness of the proceeding or confidence in the jury’s verdict” (Henning, 1999 p. 722). For
instance, a jury deciding on a case where a prosecutor intentionally concealed exculpatory
evidence would constitute both an irrational assessment of evidence and an unfair trial. Actions
of misconduct include erroneously admitting or excluding evidence in a case, improper crossexaminations, arguments, or closing statements, withholding or manipulating evidence, and jury
tampering (Alschuler, 1972; Brewer, 2001; Kirchmeier et al., 2009; Merrit, 2009; Minsker, 2009;
Plantania & Moran, 1999; White, 2002, Yaroshefsky, 2004). Explanations as to why prosecutors
may engage in misconduct are often similar to police, namely discretion, public and professional
pressure to close cases and earn convictions, and a lack of accountability.
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Types and Extent of Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct has been well documented in contributing to wrongful
convictions and represents one of the primary reasons for breakdowns in the adversarial system
(Brewer, 2001; Kirchmeier et al., 2009; Yaroshefsky, 2004). For example, in Texas,
prosecutorial misconduct was estimated to be present in 60% of cases in the appeals court
(Alschuler, 1972). Among 2,400 exonerated cases, about 30% involved prosecutorial misconduct
(Gross et al., 2020). Such misconduct most often took place in homicide cases (72%).
Prosecutorial misconduct was also found to be the second most common type of error in capital
cases following inadequate defense (Yaroshefsky, 2004). Despite its prevalence, few studies
have examined prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases specifically.
The most common type of prosecutorial misconduct by far is hiding evidence (Gross et
al., 2020; Kirchmeier et al., 2009; Merrit, 2009; Minsker, 2009; Yaroshefsky, 2004). There has
been a long history of prosecutors hiding evidence and engaging in due process violations
(Merrit, 2009). Federal courts at various levels process hundreds, if not thousands, of cases
involving Brady violations annually (Kirchmeier et al., 2009; Merrit, 2009). In some cases,
murder convictions were thrown out entirely due to hidden or falsified evidence (Merrit, 2009).
Based on information from the Innocence Project, prosecutorial misconduct such as suppressing
or destroying evidence played a role in about half of exonerated cases (Yaroshefsky, 2004). In a
sample of 2,400 exonerations, concealing exculpatory evidence was the leading type of official
misconduct, comprising 44% of cases, with prosecutors being responsible for 73% of such
actions. Evidence manipulation has contributed to death sentences as well (Minsker, 2009). To
sway the case outcome, prosecutors also introduce inadmissible evidence during legal
proceedings (Alschuler, 1972).
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Prosecutors also engage in misconduct within the courtroom. Accounting for 14% of
2,400 exonerated cases, prosecutorial trial misconduct typically encompasses perjury (8%), lying
(4%), and improper questioning during cross-examinations (1%) (Gross et al., 2020). Prosecutors
also engaged in witness tampering, procuring false testimony, and threatening a party in the case
to participate in a favorable manner. Improper opening statements, arguments, and/or closing
statements were also commonly identified (Alschuler, 1972; Brewer, 2001; Gross et al., 2020;
Kirchmeier et al., 2009; Minsker, 2009; Platania & Moran, 1999; White, 2002). Improper closing
arguments by prosecutors have been found to significantly increase the likelihood of a death
sentence being recommended in a case (Platania & Moran, 1999). In a similar vein, jury
tampering makes a death sentence more likely, particularly involving attempts to mislead or
inflame the jury by prosecutors (Alschuler, 1972; Minsker, 2009). Misleading arguments about
the potential punishment (e.g., death, life in prison, a specific release date), inappropriate
justifications for a punishment (e.g., justifying a punishment with religion or the safety of society
instead of the facts of the case), speculation about the defendant, accusatory statements regarding
the defendant’s guilt or truthfulness, and derogatory comments in general (e.g., comments
pertaining to race, religion, nationalism) could bias a jury’s decision-making (Alschuler, 1972;
Brewer, 2001; Gross et al., 2020; Minsker, 2009; White, 2002). In addition, prosecutorial
misconduct has tainted the jury selection process, such as excluding jurors based on race
(Kirchmeier et al., 2009).
Explanations for Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Given the pervasiveness of prosecutorial misconduct, possible explanations for such
behavior have been proposed. The following section provides an overview of the primary
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explanations of rational choice and external pressure, discretion in legal procedures, and
professional accountability.
In a similar vein to police, rational choice and political pressure could both play a role in
a prosecutor’s decision to engage in misconduct. When external pressure to close a case is high,
and higher conviction rates are more likely to enhance a prosecutor’s professional reputation,
monetary rewards, and promotional opportunities, misconduct may be more likely (Alschuler,
1975, Minsker, 2009). If an unethical or illegal method is the only way to achieve the desired
results, and the risks associated with such misconduct are low, then prosecutors are more likely
to engage in the behavior. This may be especially true for high profile cases when public
pressure to convict is high.
Prosecutors also have unchecked discretion in deciding who to bring charges against and
at what level of severity (Albonetti, 1987; Merrit, 2009; White, 2002). Prosecutors tend to favor
pursuing cases with more certainty (e.g., murder cases with more witnesses, evidence)
(Albonetti, 1987), so if a case is weak, a prosecutor may be motivated to engage in misconduct to
ensure a conviction. Additionally, prosecutors are less willing to assist with exoneration
proceedings of cases with allegations of official misconduct (Bowman & Gould, 2020; Webster,
2019). As such, prosecutorial discretion may impact not only the initial charging and sentencing
procedure, but the process leading to an exoneration as well.
Contrary to police misconduct being primarily the product of a lack of training or
experience (Fyfe, 1989), prosecutorial misconduct is often either negligent or intentional
(Yaroshefsky, 2004). Despite this, prosecutors are rarely held accountable (Brewer, 2001,
Yaroshefsky, 2004). From a sample of several thousand exonerated cases, of which nearly half
involved prosecutorial misconduct, only about 4% of those prosecutors received some kind of
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discipline (e.g., organizational consequences from the district attorney’s office, being disbarred,
or convicted) (Gross et al., 2020). This lack of consequences and accountability calls into
question not only the power of prosecutors, but also the capacity of the justice system to detect
and respond to such misconduct.
Judicial Misconduct
Judicial misconduct is defined as “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts” (Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28
U.S.C §§ 351-364). Essentially any action that may impede the fair and proper processing of a
criminal case could be considered judicial misconduct. Acts of misconduct by the judiciary
typically involve inappropriate comments or behaviors in the courtroom, personal bias in
decision-making, bribery, and suppressing or manipulating evidence (Brauer & Loh, 2001;
Buckley, 1969; Edwards, 1989; King, 1978a). Compared to investigations on police and
prosecutorial misconduct, a paucity of research exists regarding judicial misconduct.
Accordingly, there are limited theoretical explanations for such actions, which typically relate to
an over-burdened and under-resourced criminal justice system (Alschuler, 1972).
Types and Extent of Judicial Misconduct.
Judicial misconduct has long existed historically and has become more prevalent over
time, as documented by the American Bar Association (Brauer & Loh, 2001; Edwards, 1989;
Weingarten, 1987). Despite this, the specific extent and nature of judicial misconduct remain
largely unknown due to the scarce research on the issue.
While few statistics exist in describing the extent and types of judicial misconduct,
existing studies do suggest that judicial misconduct involves providing incorrect instructions to
21

other members of the court (e.g., the defense, witnesses, jury), making inappropriate statements
in the courtroom, outwardly demonstrating bias towards either the prosecution or the defense,
and exploiting defendants with poor legal counsel (Alschuler, 1972; King, 1978a; Klein, 2006).
Other misconduct includes intentionally trying to influence a jury or the overall outcome of a
case, lacking knowledge of specific rules or procedures, obtaining information extra-legally or
incorrectly, and showing inappropriate emotions or reactions during a trial (Buckley, 1969).
Worse yet, judicial misconduct such as committing forgery/fraud (e.g., misusing court funds,
falsifying evidence), bribery, violating rules regarding conflicts of interest, threatening
defendants, and committing perjury may constitute a crime, depending on the nature and severity
of the offense (Brauer & Loh, 2001; Edwards, 1989; King, 1978a). It is worth noting, however,
that minor forms of judicial misconduct tended to exert greater influence on case outcomes than
severe misconduct, simply because of their sheer volume (King, 1978a).
Explanations for Judicial Misconduct.
Below is a summary of the key theoretical explanations for judicial misconduct. These
explanations mainly center around an overburdened criminal justice system, discretion and the
rational choice perspective, and few consequences for malfeasance.
A large caseload and strained time and resources are the main explanations for judicial
misconduct (Alschuler, 1972). Similar to the public and professional pressure faced by police
and prosecutors, judges may feel external pressure to quickly process cases through the criminal
justice system. The notion of ‘assembly line justice’ (Klein, 2006) could strain court’s resources
and manpower, making it difficult for judges to more carefully and faithfully carry out the law.
This could also potentially undermine defendant’s due process rights.
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Just as police and prosecutors have wide discretionary power and have the ability to
engage in rational choice, judges maintain largely unquestioned power in the courtroom
(Buckley, 1969). Even with structured sentencing guidelines (Wilkins et al., 1978), judges still
have the ability to decide the final outcome of a case. This is especially relevant in death penalty
cases where after a jury votes to impose life in prison, a judge could override that decision and
issue a death sentence instead (DPIC, 2016; EJI, 2011). If a sentencing decision was made out of
prejudice (e.g., showing a pattern of overriding a jury verdict and replacing life with a death
sentence only for minority defendants) or political expediency, the judge could be on the verge
of committing judicial misconduct. If the potential benefits (e.g., an increased chance of being
re-elected or re-appointed, personal benefit) outweigh the risks, judicial misconduct could occur.
Furthermore, the inherent organization and operation of the criminal justice system could
play a role in facilitating judicial misconduct. First, accusations of judicial misconduct are rarely
investigated (Klein, 2006). This is partly because the court tended to view these complaints as
defendants’ disdain about the outcome of their case as many claims could not be substantiated
(Weingarten, 1978). It may thus be more difficult for defendants to prove judicial misconduct
occurred. Second, judges are protected by judicial immunity in many instances, making it
difficult to hold the judiciary accountable (King, 1978a). For example, impeachment of state and
federal judges often only occurs for major crimes such as bribery. A total of 15 federal judges
have been impeached for malfeasance in the history of the United States (Edwards, 1989; United
States Courts, n.d.). As such, the filter meant to catch judicial misconduct may be minimal or
even miss instances of misconduct altogether. Of police, prosecutors, and judges, judicial
officials also tend to face the fewest consequences for alleged actions of misconduct (Alschuler,
1972).
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In sum, official misconduct involving police, prosecutors, and judges has been
documented in criminal cases and connected to wrongful convictions, both in terms of
contributing to initial wrongful convictions as well as forming a potential barrier for
exonerations. Actions of misconduct often involved witness and evidence tampering, coercing
confessions, and actively attempting to influence a jury or case outcome. Explanations for
misconduct centered around rational choice coupled with discretion, public and professional
pressure, and/or an overburdened criminal justice system. Despite the prevalence of official
misconduct, police, prosecutors, and judges often faced few, if any, consequences.
Error Correction in Death Penalty Cases
The emphasis on due process and protection of defendant’s rights in criminal justice is a
central consideration when evaluating the death penalty and exonerations in America. As
concern over potential miscarriages of justice increased, a need to better understand wrongful
convictions and exonerations grew as well. Research has widely documented the factors
contributing to both wrongful convictions as well as exonerations in capital cases. As such, the
sections below provide an overview of the death penalty in America, wrongful convictions, and
the error correction mechanisms that act as a catalyst for exoneration.
The Death Penalty in America
Death penalty laws have evolved throughout the recent history in the United States. The
Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia (1972) that the random imposition of the death
penalty was a cruel and unusual punishment, and was neither rational nor objective, thus making
it unconstitutional. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court found that Georgia’s death penalty
system satisfied the constitutionality test, as it had a two-tied system involving a guilt and
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sentencing phase, and required aggravating circumstances for all death sentences. Concurrently,
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) found mandatory death sentences violated the eight and
fourteenth amendments. Later, Ford v. Wainwright (1986) and Atkins v. Virginia (2002) ruled
that executing those considered insane or mentally ill was unconstitutional, while Roper v.
Simmons (2005) prohibited minors under the age of eighteen to be executed.
Public opinion regarding the death penalty has shifted over time. A Gallup Poll found
that 66% of respondents were in favor of the death penalty in 1976, compared to 80% in 1994,
65% in 2009, and 56% in 2019. Retribution has been the primary justification for the death
penalty in the United States (Bohm, 1992; Finckenauer, 1988; Finkelstein, 2002; Oldenquist,
2004). Offender blameworthiness, revenge, and proportionality have been cited as the main
reasons for supporting the death penalty in murder cases. Deterrence has also been deemed as an
important function of the death penalty so long as it is swift, certain, and severe (Paternoster &
Bachman, 2000). Yet the actual deterrent effect of the death penalty is debated, with some
studies finding its deterrent effect on violent crimes (Dezhbakhsh & Rubin, 2000; Ehrlich, 1975;
Shepherd, 2005), while other studies have shown the brutalization effect (e.g., more murders
occurred after an execution) (Bailey, 1998; Bowers & Pierce, 1980; Cohen-Cole et al., 2006;
King, 1978b). Nevertheless, the true impact of the death penalty on crime may be likely
unknown given the rarity of executions (Donohue & Wolfers, 2006).
Despite the majority of the public lending support for the death penalty, both death
sentences and executions have generally decreased over time. For example, over the 25-year
period from 1994 to 2019, the annual number of death sentences imposed decreased from over
300 in 1994 to 34 in 2019 (DPIC, 2019). In addition, when the moratorium on the death penalty
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was lifted in 1977, 35 states reinstated the death penalty. By the end of 2019, only 28 states as
well as the federal government retained use of the death penalty (DPIC, 2020).
By the end of 2019, there were over 2,600 prisoners on death row (DPIC, 2019; DPIC
2021). These inmates were predominantly male (98%). White and Black defendants accounted
for 41% and 42% of the death row population respectively, while Hispanics accounted for 14%.
More broadly, the total prison population in the United States is 57.6% White, 38.5% Black, and
3.9% other race/ethnicities (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2021), while the overall U.S. population
is 76.3% White, 13.4% Black and 10.2% other race/ethnicities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).
Over 1,500 individuals have been executed since the 1970s, reaching a high of 98
executions in 1999. However, the number of executions has generally decreased, with 46
executions in 2010 and 22 executions in 2019. The majority of executed defendants were White
(56%), while 34% were Black and 8% were Hispanic. The victims in these death penalty cases
were overwhelmingly White (75%). Southern states (e.g., Texas, Florida) tended to carry out the
majority of executions, while Northern states (e.g., New Hampshire, New Jersey) have not
executed a single defendant since 2010. All of the individuals currently on death row were
convicted for murder, even though a variety of capital crimes remain on the lawbook (e.g.,
treason, aggravated kidnapping, drug trafficking, aircraft hijacking, placing a bomb in a bus
terminal, espionage, and aggravated assault) (DPIC, n.d.).
Exoneration and Error Correction Mechanisms
Exoneration is defined as when a defendant is factually innocent, or factually guilty but
not legally liable for the criminal action due to a constitutional rights violation or other errors
(The National Registry of Exonerations, n.d.). An exoneration may be the result of a judicial
acquittal, prosecutorial dismissal, or executive clemency (e.g., through a gubernational or
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presidential pardon). While this definition means that the defendant is exonerated from being
criminally liable for the crime and is not legally guilty, the defendant, however, may or may not
be factually guilty (see also Gross & O’Brien, 2008).
A capital case moves through the criminal justice system in several steps. The capital
case first begins with the pretrial investigation phase (e.g., police gather information and
evidence, arrest a suspect, prosecutor brings charges, preliminary hearing occurs, indictment),
then the guilt phase trial (e.g., jury selection, prosecution and defense present arguments, jury
verdict), and followed by the penalty phase trial (e.g., jury gives sentencing recommendations
which are typically life in prison or death, and then the judge hands down a sentence) (MSU &
DPIC, 2000). After the initial death sentence by the original trial court, the defendant can file
direct appeals to the state appellate court or Supreme Court; and/or simultaneously file habeas
corpus petitions at state or federal levels to seek a retrial, reduced sentence, or an acquittal
(ACLU, 2021; FindLaw, 2019; Mince-Didier, 2021). For example, federal trials would then be
addressed by a federal appeals court. Additionally, a defendant can seek clemency from a state
governor or the U.S. President to defer execution, reduce the sentence, or grant a pardon. If all of
these efforts fail, an execution would be carried out. In sum, this is a two-tiered trial system,
along with a multi-layered appeals system, which are designed to detect and correct errors in
criminal cases.
Studies have examined the extent and characteristics of exonerated criminal cases. While
the true rate of wrongful convictions remains unknown (Gross et al., 2014; Huff et al., 1986;
Huff, 2003), rate estimations range between 0.5% and 20% (Ramsey & Frank, 2007). The
National Registry of Exonerations (2021) reported over 2,750 exonerations occurred since 1989,
with about half the exonerees being Black (50%), over one third being white (36%), and less

27

than one fifth (14%) being Hispanic or another race/ethnicity. These patterns were largely
consistent with data from recent years (Gross et al., 2017; O’Brien et al., 2019). Another study
identified about 8% of exonerations (out of about 1,400 exonerees) involved women (Jackson &
Gross, 2014), which is noteworthy given that women constituted only 1.1% of executions (DPIC,
2021). Additionally, exoneration processes could take up to an average of 20 years (Gross &
O’Brien, 2008). Cases involving longer pre-trial investigation, with official misconduct, and
non-White defendants tended to take a longer time to exonerate (Gross et al., 2017; Parker et al.,
2003; Rafail & Mahoney, 2019).
For death penalty cases specifically, of a sample of 350 capital cases from 1900 to 1985,
approximately 40% of defendants were wrongfully convicted (Bedau & Radelet, 1987; Gross,
1998). Based on data from 1973 to 1995, studies found over two-third (68%) of cases involved
errors, with 7% of defendants being found as innocent (Liebman et al., 2000). Another study
estimated 1.5% of the 7,543 capital defendants were exonerated from 1973 to 2004 (Gross &
O’Brien, 2008). Since 1973, 185 exonerations have been reported, averaging about 3.9 capital
exonerations annually (DPIC, 2021). In addition, at least 23 individuals were believed to be
wrongfully executed in the United States, with the factors that contributed to the wrongful
executions being similar to those that result in wrongful convictions (e.g., witness error, official
misconduct, false confessions, ineffective counsel) (Huff, 2002). Overall, capital cases tended to
generate both higher error and error detection rates (Gross & O’Brien, 2008).
Past studies have also examined various factors contributing to an exoneration. First,
errors may be discovered and corrected through normal criminal justice processes. Governmental
institutions and legal professionals play an important role in error corrections. For example, in a
sample of 260 wrongful convictions, a sizeable number of cases resulted in exoneration due to
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defense lawyers (24%), the police (13%), prosecution (9%), and judges (13%) (Gould & Leo,
2015). Furthermore, while both state and federal courts handle capital cases, procedures at the
state level account for the majority of exonerations. For example, 90% of 2,370 erroneous death
sentences from 1973 to 1995 were either overturned or reversed by state judges (Liebman et al.,
2000). Nevertheless, police and prosecutors were also found to hinder the exoneration process in
13% of cases (Gould & Leo, 2015), when cases were uncertain, severe, or involved allegations
of professional misconduct (Bowman & Gould, 2020; Webster, 2019).
Second, the emergence of new evidence, typically through forensic science, has been
pinpointed as a means for correcting error and leading to exoneration. DNA testing is a key
component in facilitating an exoneration (Ramsey & Frank, 2007), which contributed to the
majority (79%) of 260 wrongfully convicted cases examined in Gould and Leo (2015), as well as
13% of exonerations between 1973 and 2004 in Gross et al. (2014). DNA testing was also found
to increase the chance of exoneration in murder cases (Olney & Bonn, 2015) and a quicker
exoneration process (Rafail & Mahoney, 2019). The actual offender being discovered or coming
forward represented another major factor leading to successful exonerations (Gould & Leo,
2015). Despite the importance of forensic evidence, however, many jurisdictions lacked
resources to analyze the evidence collected, resulting in delays in the error detection and
correction process.
Third, organizations and individuals outside of the criminal justice system have also been
credited as contributing to exonerations. Sometimes criminal justice agencies lack the incentive,
resources, or manpower to carry out an exoneration (Bedau & Radelet, 1987). Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as the Innocence Project can fill the gap by providing resources and
expertise (e.g., pro-bono defense counsel, DNA testing) (Rafail & Mahoney, 2019). More
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specifically, innocence organizations such as the Innocence Project and Centurion Ministries
helped identify and correct 34% of wrongful convictions (Gould & Leo, 2015). Such NGO
involvement has increased the likelihood of exoneration and a quicker process. These are
currently over 53 innocence organizations in the United States, which have assisted with over
500 exonerations since the late 1990s (O’Brien et al., 2019; Thompson et al., 2011). The criminal
defendant themselves also plays an essential role in the exoneration process, as Gould and Leo
(2015) found that 30% of capital exonerations involved defendants’ efforts such as filing court
appeals, seeking reinvestigation of their case, advocating for their own innocence, and trying to
obtain assistance from innocence organizations. Yet defendants rarely sought exoneration alone;
other external individuals such as the defendant’s family and friends, professors, journalists, and
citizens have been credited with assisting defendants and facilitating case exonerations (Bedau &
Radelet, 1987; Gould & Leo, 2015). However, NGOs and other entities also face problems such
as being underfunded, understaffed, and lacking cooperation from criminal justice officials
(Krieger, 2011). As such, whether and to what extent a defendant receives assistance from an
NGO, a university, or the media may largely depend on case quality, public interest, and other
forces outside the control of criminal justice professionals.
Overall, due process and protecting rights of defendants are the hallmark of the criminal
justice system in the United States. While errors are inevitable in any criminal process, more
errors, particularly those involving official misconduct, are likely to occur when an outcomeoriented system precedes a process-oriented one, especially when coupled with a political
mandate of crime-fighting and institutional rewards for high clearance and conviction rates. It
has been widely documented that police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct contribute to
wrongful convictions in criminal cases generally and capital cases specifically. Few studies,
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nevertheless, have detailed the specific types and extent of official misconduct in death penalty
cases. Furthermore, there is a scarcity of research examining the possible connection between
official misconduct and error correction mechanisms. As such, using all exonerated death penalty
cases from 1973 to 2019, the current study will fill the void by exploring the relationship
between official misconduct and the length and types of exoneration.
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Chapter 3: The Current Study
Using a sample of 167 exonerated death penalty cases, the current study seeks to
investigate how official misconduct contributes to wrongful convictions and the error correction
mechanisms that result in an eventual exoneration in such cases. In particular, the current study
employs manifest and latent content analysis methods to present quantitative analysis and
qualitative case narratives on specific types of misconduct engage in by police, prosecutors, and
judges. Investigating the factors that contribute to wrongful convictions and exonerations may be
beneficial for both improving the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as for better
protecting defendants due process rights. Accordingly, this study attempts to address the
following interrelated questions:
1. What extent of exonerated death penalty cases involved official misconduct?
2. What specific types of police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct were involved?
3. Which individuals, agencies, or events served as a catalyst for exoneration?
4. Was the exoneration by mechanisms internal or external to the criminal justice system?
5. Does official misconduct impact the catalyst and length of exoneration?
Data Sources and Sample
The data for the present study involves all of the 167 exonerated death penalty cases from
1973 to 2019. These cases were drawn from the Death Penalty Information Center’s (2020)
Description of Innocence Cases list, which is updated on a continual basis to catalogue
exonerated death penalty cases in the United States. Each entry on the list includes the name of
the defendant, the state where the conviction occurred, the year of initial conviction, the year of
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exoneration, links to key court rulings or news reports, and a brief summary of the case. This
information was used to guide further Internet searches for additional data on each case.
Researchers reviewed all the documents linked to each case, and used keywords such as
the name of the defendant and ‘exonerated death penalty case’ to search Google for additional
documents related to these cases. The majority of the documents generated from the searches are
from websites presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Summary of Data Sources
Website

Summary

ABA
https://www.americanbar.org/
AP News
https://apnews.com/
BBC Two NewsNight
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006mk25
Casetext
https://casetext.com/
Chron
https://www.chron.com/
Columbus Alive
https://www.columbusalive.com/
Commission on Capital Cases
http://www.floridacapitalcases.state.fl.us/
Convicting the Innocent
https://convictingtheinnocent.com/
CourtListener
https://www.courtlistener.com/
Death Penalty Information Center
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
Equal Justice Initiative
https://eji.org/
FindLaw
https://lp.findlaw.com/
Forejustice
http://forejustice.org/search_idb.htm
GovInfo
https://www.govinfo.gov/
HuffPost
https://www.huffpost.com/
Innocence Project
https://innocenceproject.org/
Justia
https://law.justia.com/
Leagle
https://www.leagle.com/
Murderpedia
https://murderpedia.org/
Northwestern Center on Wrongful Convictions
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvic
tions/
Occasionaljustice
http://occasionaljustice.com/Larry.html
Prison Legal News
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org
Shujaa Graham
http://shujaa.org/biography.html
The National Registry of Exonerations
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.a
spx
The Oklahoman
https://oklahoman.com/
Victims of the State
http://vots.altervista.org/
vLex Case Law
https://case-law.vlex.com/
Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org
Witness to Innocence
https://www.witnesstoinnocence.org

Provides various resources for advancing the legal professional and
delivering justice.
News organization which covers a variety of stories, including those related
to criminal justice and capital cases.
A news network which covers current events, including those related to
criminal justice and capital punishment.
Compiles various law documents, such as statutes, rulings, briefs, and case
summaries.
A news agency providing information on a variety of events that occur in
Texas.
A news agency providing information on a variety of events that occur in
Ohio.
Provides court actions and case summaries for capital cases in Florida.
Catalogues information on exonerations involving DNA evidence and
testing.
Compiles a variety of cases, legal opinions, and documents from state and
federal courts.
Non-profit organization that compiles a variety of information relating to
capital punishment.
Non-profit organization that provides legal representation to defendants,
case summaries, and information relating to the miscarriages of justice.
Compiles information on various cases, court proceedings, opinion
summaries, and other legal documents.
Catalogs information on innocent defendants using court reports, books, and
news articles.
Database containing various government and legal documents provided by
the U.S. Government Publishing Office.
A news agency covering a variety of topics, including matters related to
politics and the criminal justice system.
Provides information on wrongfully convicted defendants who were
eventually exonerated.
Provides court decisions and various legal documents at the state and
federal levels.
Provides decisions and opinions from state, federal, supreme, trial,
appellate, and other courts.
Compiles information on murder cases, including data on defendants, court
proceedings, and exonerations.
Provides legal services to wrongfully convicted defendants as well as
documentation of such cases.
Provides a summary of a specific exonerated defendant, Larry Hicks.
Created by the Human Rights Defense Center to document criminal justice
issues, court rulings, and legal cases primarily involving prisoners’ rights.
A biographical website from a specific defendant, Shujaa Ernest Graham,
documenting his own experience as an exonerated capital defendant.
A collaboration between various universities focusing on compiling
information on every exonerated defendant in the United States.
A news agency providing information on a variety of events that occur in
Oklahoma.
Case summaries of wrongful convictions and other incidents of errors in the
criminal justice system.
Compiles various court decisions and case documents.
Provides summaries of various exonerated capital cases. Primarily used to
find additional sources.
Documents information from exonerated capital defendants themselves in
an effort for criminal justice reform and death penalty abolition.
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Based on Table 3.1, the sources used in this study constitute a wide range of information
and perspectives relating to criminal justice issues. Prior research (Bevan et al., 2013; Budak et
al., 2016; Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010; Terris et al., 2007) suggests that all data sources, primary
or secondary, are subject to prejudice and bias, which can impact the results, conclusions, and
implications of a study.
Pertinent to the current study, there are two potential sources of bias. The first involves
political biases by governmental agencies or non-governmental agencies (NGOs). It is well
known that decision making in police departments and district attorney’s offices can be driven by
political agenda and agency priorities (Budak et al., 2016; Hammersley & Gomm, 1997;
Honeycutt & Jussim, 2020). NGOs and organizations on our list such as The Death Penalty
Information Center, Witness to Innocence, and the Innocence Project all tended to advocate for
abolishment of capital punishment and criminal justice reform. These sources, among others,
may compile information overtly in line with its agency agenda, thus might not be entirely
objective.
The second involves media bias. Ad Fontes Media’s (n.d.) Media Bias Chart scores the
political bias (e.g., extreme left, hyper-partisan left, skews left, neutral or balanced bias, skews
rights, hyper-partisan right, extreme right), reliability (e.g., most reliable for news, reliable for
news but high in analysis/opinion content, some reliability issues and/or extremism, serious
reliability issues and/or extremism), and overall reliability (e.g., a score of 0.00 to 64.00, with
higher values being more reliable) of various news sources. News media sources on our list have
varying degrees of reliability and bias. For example, the Associated Press (AP) had the highest
reliability score (52.4) and was deemed to have neutral or balanced bias slightly left-leaning.
Comparatively, Chron and BBC scored slightly lower on reliability (48.37 and 46.80

35

respectively), whereas HuffPost scored lowest for reliability (38.69) and was ranked as reliable
for news but high in analysis and opinion content. Additionally, media sources would
occasionally offer conflicting information, such as reporting two different dates for a defendant’s
conviction. In order to address these challenges, more sources would then be sought out until the
data could be confirmed.
In an attempt to address the bias and reliability issues, as a general rule and when
applicable, we primarily relied on the official sources such as court rulings at various levels as
well as the plaintiff’s and defendant’s motions to identify key facts involved in the case. These
documents are typically available from university websites or websites with legal documents
such as FindLaw and Casetext. These sources were then supplemented by reports of interviews
and quotes from courtroom players such as the defendant, legal counsel, prosecutors, police
officers, judges, or jurors. Legal analysis by experts and scholars were also used to corroborate
and construct the ‘truth’ about a case. In reconstructing a case, news sources with high reliability
are given greater weight than those with low reliability to reduce errors or biases.
Content Analysis and Coding Methodology
Content analysis was the primary method utilized for coding the various documents
associated with the 167 exonerated death penalty cases. Content analysis refers to systematically
labeling, analyzing, and making inferences from documents and communication artifacts in
various forms including text, pictures, audio, or videos to extract patterns or make inferences
(Kleinheksel et al., 2020; Mayring, 2000; Schutt, 2019). An advantage of content analysis is its
non-invasiveness, especially compared to other social science methodologies such as surveys and
interviews. Surveys and interviews may be limited by a variety of factors such as availability of
participants, individual’s willingness to cooperate, memory of specific events, and the reliability
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and truthfulness of answers provided. Comparatively, content analysis does not face these same
limitations and allowed for data to be collected from secondary, publicly available sources with
limited time and resources.
There are two major types of content analysis: manifest and latent content analyses.
Manifest analysis is defined as describing what is present (e.g., age, gender, number of victims)
without the need to discern or identify underlying meaning. This coding method primarily deals
with data that are easily observable and can be counted with little training required of the coders.
This surface-level analysis assumes there is objective truth in the data that can be revealed
without interpretation or qualification (Bengtsson, 2016; Cash & Snider, 2014; Erlingsson &
Brysiewicz, 2017; Kleinheksel et al., 2020). In contrast, latent analysis requires researchers to
identify and interpret meaning in the text (e.g., whether or not a confession was coerced), thus
requiring researchers to be more skillful and better trained (Bengtsson, 2016; Cash & Snider,
2014; Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017; Kleinheksel et al., 2020).
Both manifest and latent analyses were employed in the current study. Qualitative content
analysis was the main methodology used since categories were created inductively, instead of
deductively (Morgan, 1993). That is, guided by existing literature on police, prosecutorial, and
judicial misconduct, we first coded several cases to identify units of meaning (Erlingsson &
Brysiewicz, 2017; Kleinheksel et al., 2020). In this case, key phrases and incidents involving
professional misconduct (e.g., inducing witnesses, exchanging favors for testimony from
informants, threatening witnesses, hiding evidence, altering evidence, presenting false evidence),
were used. This was then followed by grouping the units into categories based on similarity (e.g.,
the above phrases can be grouped into two categories: witness coercion and evidence tampering).
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Finally, these categories were further grouped into broader themes (e.g., both witness coercion
and evidence tampering were grouped under the theme labeled as police misconduct).
To ensure coding reliability, the two main coders coded the pilot cases independently first
and then held meetings to compare notes and discuss any discrepancies (Schutt, 2019). While
notes were checked and compared multiple times to ensure accuracy based on available
documents that were retrieved online, some codes are necessarily subjective as latent content
analysis does require individual decision-making and discretion. A codebook was subsequently
prepared to serve as a roadmap for further coding. The codebook was left open-ended in
anticipation of expansion of the codebook categories during the actual coding process. For
example, we initially had one variable tapping informants (e.g., use of informant). As we coded
more cases, a variety of scenarios involving informants emerged (e.g., use of informants; favors
exchanged with informants for testimony; officer hid, lied about, or denied a favor agreement in
court but favor was given; informant recanted testimony). Unsure about its extent or significance
to the overall objective of this study, we decided to expand the measures of this variable by
coding these variations. Such fine-tunings enhanced both the inter and intra-coding reliability, as
the same case was often revisited once the codebook was revised.
Codes, Variables, and Measures
Following previous sentencing literature and employing manifest and latent analyses for
the purposes of the current study, three sets of data were targeted: (1) official misconduct, (2)
exonerations, and (3) characteristics of the offender and the offense.
Official misconduct, in this study, refers to any inappropriate behavior on the part of any
law enforcement officer, including the police, prosecutor, and judge, that is either immoral or
illegal or both (Champion, 2001). While intent is an important factor in determining official
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misconduct and/or its severity, in this study, official misconduct is coded primarily based on
legal documents (e.g., defense lawyers’ motions, court documents) and legal officers’ judgement,
not on intent. There are three types of official misconduct: police, prosecutorial, and judicial
misconduct.
Police misconduct is measured with four variables: (1) witness coercion and/or
tampering, (2) defendant coercion, (3) evidence tampering, and (4) other professional
misconduct. Witness coercion and/or tampering includes coercing, inducing, or threatening
witnesses, threatening others involved in the case, and exchanging and hiding favor agreements
with informants. Defendant coercion consists of coercing confessions, torture, and using corrupt
polygraph examiners. Evidence tampering includes behaviors like hiding, altering, destroying,
evidence as well as presenting false evidence in court. Other professional misconduct
encompasses actions such as giving perjured testimony, implicating a defendant without
evidence, intentionally pursuing the wrong suspect in a case, conflicts of interest, engaging in
inappropriate remarks or behaviors on duty, ignoring possibly beneficial information, using an
unfair lineup to identify suspects, and jury tampering.
Prosecutorial misconduct is measured by three variables: (1) witness coercion and/or
tampering, (2) evidence tampering, and (3) other professional misconduct. Witness coercion
and/or tampering includes actions such as inducing and threatening witnesses, eliciting false
testimony, and exchanging and hiding favor agreements with informants. Evidence tampering
incorporates hiding, alerting, and destroying evidence as well as inappropriately using and
presenting false evidence in court. Other professional misconduct encompasses a range of
behaviors such as bribery, intentionally pursuing the wrong suspect, conflicts of interest,
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inappropriate remarks or behaviors in the courtroom, dereliction, trying mentally incompetent
defendants, improperly questioning witnesses, and jury tampering.
Judicial misconduct is measured by two variables: (1) violating court procedural rules
and (2) other professional misconduct. Violating court procedural rules includes suppressing
witness testimony and evidence, improper admission of evidence, hiding evidence, jury
tampering, violating a defendant’s right to cross-examination, not polling the jury on whether the
death penalty should be used, and flawed jury instruction. Other professional misconduct
consists of accepting bribes, inappropriate remarks or behavior in the courtroom, denying
officials funds for resources, conflicts of interest, coercing or inducing defendants, and coercing
official authorities like the police or prosecutors.
All of the above variables were coded as a dummy variable, with the presence of these
factors in a case coded as a ‘1’. There was often overlap in which officials were involved in a
case, so whichever parties were mentioned in the sources were included when coding. For
example, if prosecutors knowingly presented false evidence that was gathered illegally by the
police, then both police and prosecutor misconduct were coded. Additionally, to facilitate
bivariate analyses between the different variables, three composite variables were formed by
summing all measures for each of the three types of officials. The possible range for the police
misconduct variable is 0 to 4, the prosecutorial misconduct variable is 0 to 3, and the judicial
misconduct variable is 0 to 2.
All of the 167 death penalty cases received exonerations either through a judicial decision
for acquittal, an executive pardon, or a decision by the prosecuting agency to drop charges
against a defendant. Defendants were typically released from prison after the decision was made
unless they were serving a different sentence. Exoneration variables were coded to measure the
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extent to which the criminal justice system detects and corrects errors in the sample of capital
cases. Seven factors were identified as the primary catalyst that led to an exoneration in such
cases. These include: 1) media attention, 2) non-government organization (NGO) involvement
(e.g., Innocence Project, Equal Justice Initiative), 3) government organization involvement (e.g.,
state Conviction Integrity Unit or Innocence Inquiry Commission), 4) new evidence emerged
(e.g., real offender confessed, new case files revealed), 5) new legal representation, 6) state
appeals, and 7) federal procedures involved. Oftentimes, exonerations were a result of a
combination of factors, such as obtaining a new defense team, DNA testing, media attention, or a
federal habeas corpus. To simplify the analysis, the most salient factor, or the one that is unique
and necessary for the exoneration, was identified and used in this analysis. Each of these
categories/variables were derived following the inductive, qualitative content analysis process
described in the above section.
Additionally, to address the question of whether these exonerations were by internal
criminal justice system mechanisms (e.g., the due process model successfully worked through
mechanisms already in place), or primarily through external factors (e.g., the due process model
failed to work, but a factor outside the system contributed to error correction), an ordinal variable
was created. This variable was created in the later stages of latent analysis and involved 3
different combinations of the previously mentioned exoneration variables. First, a ‘1’ represents
external mechanisms and merges the media attention, non-government organization
involvement, and new evidence emerged variables. Next, a ‘2’ signifies mixed error correction
by the system’s mechanisms as well as outside unexpected events, and combines the variables
for government organization involvement and new legal defense team. Finally, a ‘3’ denotes an
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exoneration by internal criminal justice system mechanisms and incorporates both the state
appeals and federal proceedings variables.
Lastly, the third set of data centers around information on characteristics of both the
offender themselves, the offense in question, and the case processing. The demographic variables
measure offender age (e.g., age at time of crime commission), sex (e.g., male, female),
race/ethnicity (e.g., White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Other), and existence of a prior record (e.g.,
whether or not offender had an existing deviant or criminal record during commission of the
main crime charged). A number of variables were also coded to capture case characteristics and
include the following: existence of a co-offender (e.g., whether the offender committed the crime
alone or with others), offender-victim relationship (e.g., whether the offender was a stranger,
acquaintance, or family member), the main crime charged (e.g., murder, rape, burglary,
conspiracy to commit murder), the method of carrying out the crime (e.g., shooting, stabbing,
strangulation), location (e.g., whether the crime occurred in private/semi-private locations like
the victim’s home or public locations like a grocery store), time of crime commission (e.g.,
during the daytime or nighttime), and the number of deaths (e.g., the amount of victims died).
Variables regarding the processing of the case involve jurisdictional state (e.g., the state in the
U.S. where the case took place), exoneration method (e.g., whether the defendant was exonerated
through a judicial acquittal, dismissal, or executive pardon), conviction date (e.g., the year the
defendant was convicted for the crime), exoneration date (e.g., the year the defendant was
exonerated), and the time to exoneration (e.g., the length of time in years from the initial
conviction to the exoneration). Identification of dummy variables was coded as ‘0’ and ‘1’ (e.g.,
prior record), while nominal (e.g., method of crime commission) or ordinal (e.g., offender-victim
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relationship) variables were ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’. Numerical variables were coded as the given value,
such as the age of the offender.
Data Analysis
While our data were primarily generated through qualitative content analyses, the coded
data enabled quantitative statistical analyses using the program SPSS. Univariate analyses
described the extent that certain types of police, prosecutor, and judicial misconduct occur. The
frequency of use for various error correction mechanisms was also captured through univariate
analyses. Further, bivariate analyses such as correlations, chi-square tests, and analysis of
variance (ANOVA) were run to determine if, and to what extent, a relationship exists between
specific forms of official misconduct and the different types of error correction mechanisms. As
a supplement to this qualitative data, narrative descriptions of specific cases were also presented.
Excerpts from certain cases were selected and described in order to present a more complete
picture of official misconduct and error correction mechanisms in exonerated death penalty
cases.
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Chapter 4: Results
Using a sample of 167 exonerated death penalty cases, the current study seeks to examine
police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct as well as various error correction mechanisms.
The program SPSS was utilized to conduct univariate and bivariate statistical analyses. More
specifically, frequency distributions and crosstabulation analyses were conducted to address the
five primary research questions focusing on official misconduct, exonerations, and error
correction mechanisms. Additionally, case narratives from specific exonerated death penalty
cases were presented to provide contexts for the research results.
Offender and Offense Characteristics
In order to adequately frame discussions of official misconduct, exonerations, and error
correction mechanisms, descriptions of the offender and criminal case are necessary. Table A.1
presents frequency distributions of major offender and offense variables for the sample of
exonerated death penalty inmates. The exonerated death penalty offenders were mainly male
(98.2%), approximately half were Black (51.5%), and the average age at the time of crime
commission was about 29 years old. Among the 122 (out of 167) offenders whose prior record
was known, over half of them had a prior deviant or criminal record (69.7%). About half of the
offenses involved at least two offenders (55.6%) and occurred between strangers (58.2%).
Regarding offense characteristics, murder accounted for the supermajority of the cases in
our sample (97%). Other crimes included rape, burglary, and conspiracy to commit murder.
Among the murder cases, the most common method of crime commission was shooting (48.8%),
followed by stabbing/strangulation (32.7%) and other methods (18.5%). When data was
available, crimes appeared to mostly occur during nighttime (65.8%) and in private/semi-private
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locations (62.1%) such as inside the victim’s home or apartment. A majority of cases involved a
single death (68.7%), while others involved multiple (31.3%).
The greatest amount of cases took place in Florida (17.9%), followed by Illinois (12.5%),
Texas (7.2%), Louisiana (6.6%), North Carolina (6.0%), and Oklahoma (6.0%). Frequencies for
the remaining jurisdictions can be found in Table A.1, as each state was responsible for nine
cases or less. Charges being dropped or dismissed by the prosecuting body accounted for the
majority of the exonerations (59.3%), followed by exoneration decisions by the judiciary
(36.5%), and pardons by the executive body (4.2%). Conviction dates ranged from 1963 to 2014,
with the greatest amount of cases (43.1%) falling between 1980 and 1989. In comparison,
exoneration dates spanned from 1973 to 2019, with 2000 to 2009 being the time period that
resulted in the most capital exonerations (33.5%). The average length of time to exoneration was
twelve years, however this ranged from one to forty-three years depending on the specific case.
Official Misconduct
To address the first research question regarding what extent of exonerated death penalty
cases involved official misconduct, univariate analyses were conducted. Of the 167 cases in the
sample, the supermajority of the cases (82.6%) contained some type of official misconduct.
The presence of misconduct by each police, prosecutors, and judges along with various
specific types of misconduct are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. These statistics helped
answer the second research question regarding the extent and types of official misconduct.
Table 4.1 shows police misconduct was present in 60.5% of the cases. There were four
main categories, including witness coercion/tampering, defendant coercion, evidence tampering,
and other professional misconduct. Witness coercion/tampering was the most common form of
police misconduct (37.1%), which usually included behaviors such as coercing and inducing
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witnesses, as well as exchanging then hiding favor agreements with informants. The second most
common police misconduct was evidence tampering (31.1%) that involved officers hiding,
altering, destroying, and falsifying evidence. Other professional police misconduct took place in
38 cases (22.8%) and spanned a wide range of behavior such as giving perjured testimony,
intentionally pursuing the wrong suspect, implicating a suspect without evidence, and ignoring
information in a case. While defendant coercion was least frequent (18%), torture and coerced
confessions could have serious implications.
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Table 4.1 Frequency Distributions of Police Misconduct (N = 167)
Variable
Police misconduct
1 Yes
2 No
Witness coercion/tampering
Coerced witness
Induced/threatened witness
Exchanged & hid favor agreements with informants
Threatened others
Defendant coercion
Coerced confession
Tortured defendant
Corrupted polygraph examiner
Evidence tampering
Hid evidence
Presented false evidence
Altered/destroyed evidence
Other professional misconduct
Gave perjured testimony
Intentionally pursued wrong suspect
Implicated defendant without evidence
Ignored information
Used unfair lineup
Conflict of interest
Inappropriate remarks/courtroom behavior
All other police misconduct
Severity of police misconduct
0 no misconduct in case (lease severe)
1 category of misconduct in case
2 categories of misconduct in case
3 and 4 categories of misconduct in case (most severe)

Frequency
167
101
66
62
45
38
33
3
30
23
13
7
52
34
25
24
38
11
9
7
7
4
3
3
6
167
66
42
38
21

Percent
100.0
60.5
39.5
37.1

18.0

31.1

22.8

100.0
39.5
25.1
22.8
12.6

In order to examine the severity of police misconduct in a particular case, a composite
variable was formed by summing all the measures for police misconduct. The possible range of
misconduct is zero (least severe) to three (most severe). While 39.5% of the cases had no police
misconduct whatsoever, just over a quarter of the sample (25.1%) involved one main category of
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misconduct. The remaining 59 cases (35.4%) had two or more categories of police misconduct
present.

Table 4.2 Frequency Distributions of Prosecutor Misconduct (N = 167)
Variable
Prosecutorial misconduct
1 Yes
2 No
Witness coercion/tampering
Exchanged & hid favor agreements with informants
Induced/threatened witness
Elicited false testimony
Evidence tampering
Hid evidence
Presented false evidence
Altered/destroyed evidence
Inappropriately used evidence
Other professional misconduct
Inappropriate remarks/courtroom behavior
Tampered with jury
Conflict of interest
Intentionally pursued wrong suspect
All other prosecutorial misconduct
Severity of prosecutorial misconduct
0 no misconduct in case (least severe)
1 category of misconduct in case
2 categories of misconduct in case
3 categories of misconduct in case (most severe)

Frequency
167
109
58
47
30
29
8
86
70
19
16
8
40
15
13
6
6
9
167
58
58
38
13

Percent
100.0
65.3
34.7
28.1

51.5

24.0

100.0
34.7
34.7
22.8
7.8

Table 4.2 demonstrates the frequency distributions of prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct was present in 109 cases (65.3%) with the categories of witness
coercion/tampering, evidence tampering, and other professional misconduct. The most common
category of prosecutorial misconduct was evidence tampering (51.5%), which usually involved
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prosecutors hiding evidence from other parties in the case, but also included altering, destroying,
falsifying, or inappropriately using evidence as well. Witness coercion/tampering occurred
second most often (28.1%), where prosecutors engaged in behaviors like exchanging then hiding
deals with informants, inducing and threatening witnesses, and eliciting false testimony. Other
professional misconduct occurred relatively less frequently (24.0%), and involved prosecutors
using inappropriate language or behaviors in the courtroom, tampering with the jury, engaging in
conflicts of interest, and intentionally pursuing the wrong suspect.
Severity of prosecutorial misconduct was also assessed using a composite variable with a
range of zero (least severe) to three (most severe). Prosecutorial was the most prevalent
misconduct compared to its police and judiciary counterparts. While approximately one third of
the cases involved no prosecutorial misconduct (34.7%), the same number of cases involved one
category of prosecutorial misconduct (34.7%). The more serious prosecutorial misconduct
existed in 30.6% of the cases, with 22.8% of cases having two categories of prosecutorial
misconduct and 7.8% of cases having all three categories.
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Table 4.3 Frequency Distributions of Judicial Misconduct (N = 167)
Variable
Presence
1 Yes
2 No
Violated court procedural rules
Violated right to cross-examination
Flawed jury instruction
Improperly admitted evidence
Suppressed witness testimony/evidence
All other judicial procedural violations
Other professional misconduct
Inappropriate remarks/courtroom behavior
Accepted bribe
Denied funds for resources
All other judicial misconduct
Severity of judicial misconduct
0 no misconduct in case (least severe)
1 category of misconduct in case
2 categories of misconduct in case (most severe)

Frequency
167
29
138
23
7
7
6
6
6
14
6
3
3
4
167
138
21
8

Percent
100.0
17.4
82.6
13.8

8.4

100.0
82.6
12.6
4.8

The frequency distributions of judicial misconduct are displayed in Table 4.3. Judicial
misconduct was present in 17.4% of cases, making it the least prevalent among the three types of
official misconduct. The two main categories of judicial misconduct involved violating court
procedural rules and other professional misconduct. Violating court procedural rules was the
more frequent category (13.8%), involving misconduct such as a judge violating the defendant’s
right to cross-examination, flawed jury instruction, and improper admission or suppression of
witness testimony or evidence. Other professional judicial misconduct occurred in just 14 cases
(8.4%), where judges engaged in behaviors such as making inappropriate remarks or behaviors
in the courtroom, accepting bribes, and denying funds for resources in a case.
A composite variable was created in order to assess the severity of judicial misconduct in
a particular case. The range of judicial misconduct severity is zero (least severe) to two (most

50

severe). The majority of cases in the sample involved no judicial misconduct (82.6%). However,
21 cases (12.6%) involved one category of judicial misconduct whereas 8 cases (4.8%) involved
two categories.
Exoneration
To address the third research question of which individuals, agencies, or events served as
a catalyst for exoneration, seven main factors were identified as the primary catalyst for an
exoneration (see Table 4.4). These seven factors included new evidence emerged (16.7%), media
attention (14.4%), non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement (e.g., the Innocence
Project and Equal Justice Initiative) (7.8%), new legal representation (8.4%), government
organizational involvement (e.g., state Conviction Integrity Units or Innocence Inquiry
Commissions) (3.0%), state appeals (37.7%), and federal procedures involved (e.g., filing a
petition for habeas corpus) (12.0%).

Table 4.4 Catalyst for Exoneration (N = 167)
Category

Code

External

1

Mixed
Factors

2

Internal

3

Variable
New evidence emerged
Media attention
Non-governmental organization (NGO)
involved
Total
New legal representation
Governmental organization involved
Total
State appeals
Federal procedures involved
Total
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Frequency
28
24
13

Percent
16.7
14.4
7.8

65
14
5
19
63
20
83

38.9
8.4
3.0
11.4
37.7
12.0
49.7

An ordinal variable combining these seven mechanisms was then created in order to
address the fourth research question of whether an exoneration was by mechanisms internal or
external to the criminal justice system. The seven catalysts for exoneration were grouped into the
three categories shown in Table 4.4. An exoneration representing internal criminal justice
mechanisms was the most common as nearly half the cases (49.7%) were exonerated as a result
of factors already in place in the criminal justice system (e.g., state appeals and federal
procedures). An exoneration involving mechanisms external to the justice system was the second
most common playing a role in 38.9% of cases. Here outside factors such as media attention,
non-governmental organization involvement, and new evidence emerging were the primary
factors that contributed to an exoneration. Finally, mixed factors, meaning error correction as a
result of both safeguards in the criminal justice system and random outside forces (e.g.,
governmental organization involvement and new legal defense teams), accounted for 11.4% of
the cases.
Official Misconduct and Exoneration
Given that official misconduct was rather prevalent in these exonerated death penalty
cases, it is highly probable that the criminal justice system’s ability or effectiveness in addressing
defendants’ claims of innocence or abuse by criminal justice officials may be hindered. Based on
existing literature (Bowman & Gould, 2020; Krieger, 2011; Webster, 2019), police and
prosecutors are reluctant in their involvement in exonerations, and worse yet, they may even
hinder the exoneration process when official misconduct is identified in the original proceeding.
It is thus expected that exonerations are likely to take longer and involve external mechanisms,
rather than be a shorter amount of time and through internal processes. To address the fifth
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research question regarding the possible impact of official misconduct on the catalyst and length
of exoneration, several crosstabulation analyses were performed. The crosstabulations were run
between police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct severity and the catalyst and the length of
exonerations.
Of the three types of misconduct, only police misconduct was found to have a significant
correlation with the catalyst and the length of exonerations (r = -.282* and r = .28**
respectively; see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Our findings suggest that the more severe the police
misconduct, the more likely the cases were exonerated using external mechanisms, rather than by
internal justice system factors; moreover, the exoneration process tended to last a significantly
longer time than in cases without police misconduct.
Neither the severity of prosecutorial nor judicial misconduct, however, were significantly
correlated with exoneration. With prosecutorial misconduct, cases were more likely to result in
an exoneration through external factors, not internal, though this correlation was not significant.
Cases involving prosecutorial misconduct also tended to take a longer time to exonerate, though
this correlation was nonsignificant. Comparatively, cases with judicial misconduct were more
likely to result in exoneration through internal factors, though the correlation was very weak and
insignificant. Cases with judicial misconduct took longer to exonerate as well, despite a lack of
significance. The complete results for both prosecutorial and judicial misconduct can be found in
Tables A.2, A.3., A. 4., and A.5.
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Table 4.5 Police Misconduct Severity and Catalyst for Exoneration (N = 167)
Exoneration by Internal or External Mechanisms
External
18

Mixed Factors
7

Internal
41

Total
66

4

24

42

4

13

38

4

5

21

19

83

167

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
14
Misconduct
Police
2 Categories of
21
Misconduct
Misconduct
Severity
3 & 4 Categories
12
of Misconduct
Total
65
2
Note. x = 15.492; df = 6; p = .017 (p < .05); r = -.282

Table 4.6 Police Misconduct Severity and Length of Exoneration (N = 167)
Length of Time to Exoneration (years)
1–9
41
16

10 – 19
19
22

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
Misconduct
Police
2 Categories of
12
13
Misconduct
Misconduct
Severity
3 & 4 Categories
8
8
of Misconduct
Total
77
62
2
Note. x = 25.384; df = 9; p = .003 (p < .01); r = .280
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20 – 29
4
4

30 +
2
0

Total
66
42

6

7

38

2

3

21

16

12

167

Case Narratives
To provide context for our quantitative analyses, below are case narratives of specific
exonerated death penalty cases that highlighted various types of official misconduct and
conditions under which exonerations occurred.
Regarding police misconduct, the most common type involved witness coercion and
tampering. In the Adams case (case 37), for example, a witness was initially unable to identify
Adams in a police lineup; the police told the witness to pick Adams and in exchange, dropped
the robbery charges against the witness’s daughter. In the Manning case (case 154), one of the
witnesses alleged that the police threatened to take her child away if she did not implicate
Manning. Evidence tampering and defendant coercion were also commonly engaged in by the
police. In the Ferber case (case 25), for instance, police tampered with an identification sketch of
the suspect (e.g., using Ferber’s mug shot to aid the sketch) in order to corroborate charges
against Ferber. Officers also withheld evidence that the key witness failed a polygraph test.
Additionally, an officer refused to provide evidence to the court regarding an informant,
claiming that documents were stolen from their office. In the Patterson case (case 101),
Patterson confessed to the crime but only after being chained to the wall of a police interrogation
room and tortured into signing a confession. Patterson used a paperclip to scratch a message into
a bench, writing that the police threatened him with violence and suffocated him with plastic
until he agreed to confess. These detectives also had a reputation for torturing African American
suspects. The Hobley case (case 102) demonstrated a combination of police misconduct. In
court, police claimed Hobley willingly came to the police station and confessed (yet could not
produce the confession record), contrary to Hobley’s statement that the officers restrained him,
beat him, and suffocated him until he passed out. Additionally, officers tried to pressure a
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witness into implicating Hobley even after the witness could not identify Hobley from a lineup.
The police also intentionally hid and destroyed evidence unfavorable to the state’s case, failed to
pursue leads of another suspect likely having committed the crime, and intentionally planted
evidence to match Hobley’s false confession.
In a similar vein, prosecutorial misconduct is numerous. The most frequent action
involved hiding evidence. For instance, in the Lee case (case 156), prosecutors concealed
evidence that connected other suspects to the crime and misplaced or destroyed fingerprints and
hairs from the crime scene that did not match Lee. Prosecutors failed to disclose a written note
implicating that the Lee case was fabricated, and presented false evidence in court (e.g., use of
certain guns in the crime). Similar actions were also found in the Brandley case (case 40), where
prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence and hid or destroyed evidence (e.g., pubic hair and
spermatozoid from the victim) that may have cleared Handley. Additionally, police and
prosecutorial misconduct often overlap. An example of this can be found in the Benavides case
(case 163), where both police and prosecutors worked together to manipulate evidence and
coerce witnesses. One witness was told that unless she provided a testimony against Benavides,
she would never be allowed to go home, while another witness was told she would lose custody
of her children if she did not testify. Evidence of the victim’s initial x-rays was suppressed and
medical experts who made false claims and intentionally misinterpreted evidence were also
utilized.
Despite being less prevalent than police and prosecutorial misconduct, actions of judicial
misconduct also occurred. The most common misconduct involved violating court procedural
rules. For example, in the Spicer case (case 6), the Supreme Court overturned the initial ruling,
citing the lower court’s judge violating Spicer’s right to cross-examination. The judge prohibited
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the defense from cross-examining a jailhouse snitch. Similarly, in the Prion case (case 106), the
judge committed what the High Court regarded as an error by hearing two separate cases
simultaneously and not allowing the defense to include evidence of the other suspect. In addition
to violating court procedural rules, a variety of other types of judicial misconduct occurred
throughout the cases. For instance, in the Richardson case (case 39), the judge withheld evidence
and outwardly stated multiple times throughout the jury trial that Richardson was guilty and that
murder charges would be brought against him. With the Jones case (case 79), the judge refused
to grant permission for Jones to obtain DNA testing, despite DNA being the reason for Jones’s
guilty charge. The judge ridiculed the defense lawyer’s request for the DNA test and told them to
talk to the press instead. Lastly, in the Fields case (case 130), the judge accepted a ten-thousand
dollar bribe to frame Fields from a lawyer who was representing another suspect related to the
crime. Upon the FBI’s investigation, the judge turned themselves in, which prompted a retrial.
Moreover, the context and conditions involved in exonerations varied greatly. The three
case narratives below provided glimpses of the catalysts, events, or actors for exonerations.
Given that criminal defense plays an essential role in the criminal process, especially in death
penalty cases, a competent defense team was even more crucial to secure an exoneration. For
example, the Willis case (case 118) involved a fire that killed two people. The original defense
lawyer was very passive and did not object to the prosecutor calling Willis a satanic demon and a
murderer. The defense also failed to call witnesses to the stand who could have testified in favor
of Willis. A new defense team, comprised of attorneys from the Latham & Watkins firm, took
over the Willis case pro bono. They discovered that another individual actually confessed to
committing the crime. A new arson expert was also brought onto the case, who stated that there
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was no proof that Willis started the fire intentionally. Combined, these factors led to the district
attorney dismissing the charges against Willis.
In multiple cases, mechanisms like media attention and non-governmental organization
involvement played a substantial role in exoneration. For instance, in the Steidl case (case 114),
Steidl was convicted of murdering a couple based on witness identification. The witness later
admitted that she falsely testified and recanted her statement, however she later rescinded her
recantation and asserted that her original statement was true. The witness later interviewed for
the television program 48 Hours. Consequently, journalism students at Northwestern University
became interested in the case and began interviewing other witnesses, who were not interviewed
by the police. With new evidence emerging, the case was reinvestigated by the authorities, which
ultimately led to a dismissal of the charges against Steidl by the prosecution.
Furthermore, the Aguirre-Jarquin case (case 164) serves as an example of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) playing a substantial role in an exoneration. Aguirre-Jarquin
was convicted of stabbing two people to death with a knife that was supposedly from the
restaurant where he worked. A jury voted in favor of the death penalty for Aguirre-Jarquin based
on various pieces of forensic evidence (e.g., blood spatter on clothing, fingerprint and blood on
the knife). The defense eventually reached out to the Innocence Project to request help with
DNA testing of over 80 pieces of evidence. The Innocence Project agreed and conducted the
testing, which revealed that Aguirre-Jarquin did not match the DNA. Aguirre-Jarquin was
eventually awarded a new trial based on the newly tested evidence, resulting in the prosecution
deciding to drop the charges against Aguirre-Jarquin entirely.
In sum, chapter 4 described the results of the univariate and bivariate analyses of the key
variables regarding official misconduct, and catalysts and the length for exonerations. In
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addition, the case narratives provided highlight the main characteristics and types of official
misconduct and the contexts regarding these exonerated cases. In the final chapter,
interpretations of the key research results along with theoretical and policy implications will be
discussed.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Prior research has demonstrated that official misconduct contributes to wrongful
convictions in criminal cases. However, a paucity of research exists examining the role of
official misconduct in wrongfully convicted death penalty cases specifically. In order to address
this gap in the literature, the current study is guided by Packer’s (1964) crime control and due
process models and employs content analysis to a sample of 167 exonerated death penalty cases
in the United States to explore the types and extent police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct
involved in capital cases. Given that a sample of exonerated cases is used, the study also
examines the error correction mechanisms which work to turn a wrongful conviction into an
exoneration. More specifically, various catalysts for exoneration are evaluated to determine if an
exoneration was carried out through internal due process mechanisms already in place in the
criminal justice system or through various mechanisms that are external to the system. Analyses
were then conducted to further explore the relationship between official misconduct and
exonerations. The major findings of the study, along with implications for public policy and
future research, are discussed in the subsequent sections.
Discussion
Data was collected on both offender and offense characteristics in order to provide
context to these exonerated death penalty cases in the sample. Offenders tended to be under
thirty years old, male, and non-White, while the crimes charged were overwhelmingly murder.
While the racial compositions of death row appeared somewhat even (e.g., 41% White vs. 42%
Black), just over half the exonerees in this sample were Black (51.5%). Compared to 37.7%
White exonerees, it may appear that Black individuals are exonerated at a disproportionately
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higher rate. However, this phenomenon could be indicative of a higher underlying error rate in
the cases of Black defendants, where problems such as official misconduct are involved and
investigated more frequently. For instance, prior research has found that official misconduct is
more prevalent in the cases of Black individuals, especially those on death row (Gross et al.,
2020).
For the exonerated defendants within the current study, an exoneration tended to take an
average of 12 years to occur, with a range of 1 to 43 years depending on the specific case. This is
important to note because once an individual becomes involved with the justice system, a
substantial portion of their life could be spent dealing with the system (e.g., trying to get their
case heard, reviewed, and ultimately changed). While the justice system may be able to correct
the errors, the time that an individual loses dealing with a wrongful conviction cannot be
replaced. Even further, as the sample is comprised of death penalty cases, if the defendants were
to be executed, such a punishment is irreversible. Not only are there high stakes for defendants,
but wrongful convictions could have consequences for public safety and perceptions of the
justice system as a whole.
As for official misconduct, police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct played a role in
over three quarters of the cases in the sample. This suggests that official misconduct, in varying
degrees and severities, often plays a role in wrongfully convicted death penalty cases. Our
analysis also found that prosecutorial misconduct was the most prevalent type of official
misconduct (65.3%), followed by police (60.5%) and judicial (17.4%) misconduct.
Among the three types of official misconduct, police misconduct was the only type
significantly correlated with the catalyst for exoneration and length of time to exoneration. That
is, in cases where police misconduct was more severe, the case was more likely to result in an
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exoneration due to inadvertent, external reasons (e.g., media attention, NGO involvement, new
evidence emerged), which were not inherently built into the system. In other words, it was more
due to luck that the defendant’s case received unusual media attention, attracted a particular
interest from a non-profit organization who voluntarily helped with the DNA testing, or another
individual later confessed to the crime. Conversely, when there is not police misconduct or
misconduct is minor, the exoneration was more likely to be by an internal criminal justice
process (e.g., state appeals, federal procedures). These findings could be the result of official
misconduct making a case more complicated as well as the fact that officials themselves are
often reluctant to assist with an exoneration when there are allegations of misconduct (Bowman
& Gould, 2020; Webster, 2019). As such, defendants may feel the need to seek assistance from
parties outside of the justice system for help with their case.
In addition, our analyses revealed that police misconduct directly impacted the time
length to exoneration. The exoneration tended to take a shorter amount of time to occur when
there was no or minor police misconduct involved. Time between conviction and exoneration
increases significantly when police misconduct becomes more severe. These results align with
prior research demonstrating that cases involving official misconduct tended to take a longer
time to lead to exoneration (Gross et al., 2019; Rafail & Mahoney, 2019). This could be because
cases involving accusations of official misconduct tend to involve more in-depth investigative
processes (Gross & O’Brien, 2008). These findings suggest that police misconduct has a
profound impact on the case outcome, by being both an obstacle to a normal exoneration process
as well as delaying the exoneration.
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Theoretical and Policy Implications
The major theoretical implications of the current study surround the benefits and
drawbacks of the due process and crime control models. The results of the study demonstrate the
seemingly inherent conflict between these models. The due process model focuses on protecting
due process rights by ensuring defendants receive a fair and impartial trial. This is at odds with
the crime control model, which largely prioritizes controlling crime and quickly processing and
closing criminal cases. The competing institutional goals may thus create a grave challenge for
the police as to how to balance the need to solve crime and protect public safety while protecting
individual rights and preventing governmental abuse. Informed with the findings regarding
police misconduct and exoneration, there seems to be a great need to reexamine procedural
safeguards that are supposedly put in place to prevent, detect, and correct errors in case
processing. While constitutional rights have been enhanced throughout the past decades (e.g., the
exclusionary rule, right to legal counsel, right to appeal, and so on), mechanisms still appear
lacking. Approximately half of the cases were exonerated due to external mechanisms such as
media exposure, NGO involvement, new defense teams, or accidental discovery of the ‘truth’,
suggesting that it is imperative to reexamine institutional priorities and enhance rules and laws to
improve case processing.
Literature suggests that a variety of motivations and factors contribute to official
misconduct. Take police misconduct as an example. Political (e.g., clearance rate), professional
(e.g., crime fighting and being a detective carries a prestigious status), and public pressure (e.g.,
punitive and tough on crime), both on an institutional level as well as an individual level, may
lead to misconduct. When combined with discretion and lack of transparency on the street and in
the interrogation room (e.g., no recording), overzealous officials may be motivated to overstep
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the ethical (e.g., the Manning case) or legal (e.g., the Ferber case) boundaries to achieve their
goals. Worse yet, some police officers may let their personal biases (e.g., biases towards
minority groups or people with criminal records, in the Patterson and Benavides cases) interfere
with professional judgement. While at times the line between ethical or unethical, legal or illegal,
misconduct may be blurred, particularly in the absence of a clear motive, the findings of this
study show the need to raise awareness, enhance training, and improve internal reviews of
official misconduct, so as to curb future wrongful convictions attributable to official misconduct.
These policy recommendations are certainly applicable to the prosecutorial and judiciary bodies
as well.
Regarding exonerations, the current study demonstrates that they are the product of both
factors internal and external to the criminal justice system. Existing criminal justice system
mechanisms accounted for nearly half of the exonerations in the sample, indicative of its ability
of self-correction (e.g., through appeals or habeas corpus). However, this also implies that the
current system is far beyond being foolproof. It is in fact quite astonishing that if not for external
forces (e.g., media attention, NGO involvement), almost half of the offenders in the sample
would have remained on death row or been executed. This in turn raises questions with the
practices of the criminal justice system. If the death penalty is the most serious punishment a
defendant can receive, one would expect that wrongful convictions, especially involving official
misconduct, should happen infrequently or not at all. And, when official misconduct did happen,
the correction mechanisms should be embedded in the system and be able to quickly detect and
correct the error. When the stakes are so high, the system must be equipped at all stages to ensure
minimal wrongful convictions and maximum error corrections, if defendants’ rights are the
cornerstone of the due process model.
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Readers should be cautioned, however, with the data and methodological limitations of
the current study. For instance, our sample size is small (e.g., only 167 cases) and only involves
exonerated death penalty cases. Findings are thus unable to be generalized to non-capital cases.
Additionally, since each case in the study was exonerated, there is no comparison group
available to draw further conclusions. Future research should expand the dataset by including
non-death penalty cases and unexonerated cases so as to facilitate analyses on the role of official
misconduct in contributing to wrongful convictions as well as the similarities and differences
between capital and non-capital cases.
Furthermore, while content analysis has strengths such as non-invasiveness, use of fewer
resources, and the ability to use publicly available secondary data, utilizing other methodologies
could help improve validity of the research findings and generate more in-depth understanding of
the issues. Besides relying on existing documents and through content analyses, future studies
could obtain data from interviews and surveys with key players in the courtroom (e.g.,
defendants, police officers, prosecutors, judges). Courtroom observations could also be used to
gain a better understanding of the interplay of the competing goals of these various players and
how official misconduct impacts exonerations in capital and non-capital cases. More
importantly, through data triangulation, future research could hopefully help expand knowledge
in the field of criminal justice and shape public policy in a way that better protects defendant’s
rights, reduces wrongful convictions, and better uses criminal justice system resources.
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Appendix

Table A.1 Frequency Distributions of Major Offender and Offense Variables (N = 167)
Variable
Offender age (n = 162)
Sex
Male
Female
Race/ethnicity
White
Black
Other
Prior record (n = 122)
No prior record
Deviant/criminal
Co-offender (n = 153)
No
Yes
Offender-victim relationship (n = 153)
Stranger
Acquaintances/family
Main crime charged
Murder
Non-murder (rape, burglary, conspiracy)
Method of crime (n = 162)
Shooting
Stabbing/strangulation
Other methods
Location of crime (n = 145)
Private/Semi-private
Public
Time of crime (n = 111)
Nighttime
Daytime
# of deaths (n = 166)
One death
Multiple deaths
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Frequency
Mean: 28.5

Percent
Range: 15 – 54

164
3

98.2
1.8

63
86
18

37.7
51.5
10.8

37
85

30.3
69.7

68
85

44.4
55.6

89
64

58.2
41.8

162
5

97.0
3.0

79
53
30

48.8
32.7
18.5

90
55

62.1
37.9

73
38

65.8
34.2

114
52

68.7
31.3

Jurisdictional state
Florida
Illinois
Texas
Louisiana
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Arizona
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Alabama
Georgia
California
Mississippi
Missouri
New Mexico
Massachusetts
Tennessee
Indiana
South Carolina
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Kentucky
Maryland
Nebraska
Nevada
Virginia
Washington
Exoneration method
Charges dropped
Judicial exoneration
Governor pardon
Conviction date
1963 – 1969
1970 – 1979
1980 – 1989
1990 – 1999
2000 – 2009
2010 – 2014
Exoneration date
1973 – 1979
1980 – 1989
1990 – 1999
2000 – 2009
2010 – 2019
Time to exoneration (years)
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30
21
12
11
10
10
9
9
7
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

17.9
12.5
7.2
6.6
6.0
6.0
5.4
5.4
4.2
3.6
3.6
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.4
1.8
1.8
1.2
1.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

99
61
7

59.3
36.5
4.2

4
36
72
42
8
5

2.4
21.6
43.1
25.1
4.8
3.0

14
25
43
56
29
Mean: 12

8.4
15.0
25.7
33.5
17.4
Range: 1 - 43

Table A.2 Prosecutorial Misconduct Severity and Catalyst for Exoneration (N = 167)
Exoneration by Internal or External Mechanisms
External
19

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
21
Misconduct
Prosecutorial
2 Categories of
19
Misconduct Misconduct
Severity
3 Categories of
6
Misconduct
Total
65
2
Note. x = 5.221; df = 6; p = .516 (p < .05); r = -.141

Mixed Factors
5

Internal
34

Total
58

8

29

58

5

14

38

1

6

13

19

83

167

Table A.3 Prosecutorial Misconduct Severity and Length of Exoneration (N = 167)
Length of Time to Exoneration (years)
1–9
33

10 – 19
19

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
29
17
Misconduct
Prosecutorial
2 Categories of
9
20
Misconduct
Misconduct
Severity
3 Categories of
6
6
Misconduct
Total
77
62
2
Note. x = 13.922; df = 9; p = .125 (p < .05); r = .138
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20 – 29
3

30 +
3

Total
58

7

5

58

5

4

38

1

0

13

16

12

167

Table A.4 Judicial Misconduct Severity and Catalyst for Exoneration (N = 167)
Exoneration by Internal or External Mechanisms
External
56

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
4
Judicial
Misconduct
Misconduct
2 Categories of
5
Severity
Misconduct
Total
65
2
Note. x = 6.524; df = 4; p = .163 (p < .05); r = .013

Mixed Factors
16

Internal
66

Total
138

2

15

21

1

2

8

19

83

167

Table A.5 Judicial Misconduct Severity and Length of Exoneration (N = 167)
Length of Time to Exoneration (years)
1–9
61
11

10 – 19
56
6

0 No Misconduct
1 Category of
Judicial
Misconduct
Misconduct
2 Categories of
5
0
Severity
Misconduct
Total
77
62
2
Note. x = 7.238; df = 6; p = .299 (p < .05); r = .016
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20 – 29
12
2

30 +
9
2

Total
138
21

2

1

8

16

12

167
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